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Abstract 
We investigate the effects of economic crises on the subsequent economic performance, 
economic reform, democratization and institutional change. Our analysis is based on a sample 
of post-communist countries, most of which experienced severe economic crises during the 
1990s. We find that the severity of crisis has had a positive impact on the subsequent pace of 
economic reform, economic growth and, with a delay, on investment and institutional change. 
Episode of high inflation, moreover, translate into lower subsequent inflation. Crises thus 
appear to serve as catalysts of reform and institutional change and lead to better long-term 
economic performance.  
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1 Introduction 
Why do countries undertake systemic reforms of their economies? An important motivation is 
the desire and need to improve the wellbeing of their citizens. However, the long-term 
outcome of economic reforms is uncertain while they are usually associated with substantial 
costs and economic hardship in the short run (Roland, 2000, chapters 2 and 3). As a result, 
efficiency-enhancing reforms may be rejected by voters even if they are expected to benefit 
the majority of them (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991; Rodrik, 1999) or they may be postponed 
inefficiently long (Alesina and Drazen, 1991).  
Alesina and Drazen (1991) make an intriguing proposition: reforms are postponed because 
of a war of attrition over who will bear their costs. The economic situation then worsens 
progressively until, for one of the parties concerned, the cost of postponing the reform any 
further exceeds the cost of implementing them. They observe, for example, that it is typically 
easier to drum up wide-spread political support for a stabilization program when inflation 
reaches hyperinflationary proportions but not during the preceding (often long) period of 
moderately high inflation. In other words, reform only gets implemented when the underlying 
situation reaches crisis proportions and becomes unsustainable: things have to get really bad 
before they can start getting better.  
This view has received some empirical support. Bruno and Easterly (1996, 1998) find that 
growth accelerates following high-inflation crises and that crisis-stricken countries tend to 
stabilize inflation, liberalize and open up their economies and privatize public assets. Drazen 
and Easterly (2001), similarly, find that extreme values of inflation and black-market 
premiums tend to be followed by more dramatic improvements in subsequent performance 
than moderate ones. Drazen and Easterly consider also the effect of growth crises but fail to 
find any evidence that they foster subsequent improvements. In contrast, Pitlik and Wirth 
(2003), who consider both growth and inflation crises, find that deep crises of either type 
foster subsequent economic reform whereas moderate crises have little or no effect.  
Crises can also have important political repercussions. On the one hand, the economic and 
political changes in Eastern Europe during the 1990s and the recent Arab Spring in the Middle 
East alike were, to a large extent, motivated by the failures of incumbent regimes to improve 
the wellbeing of their citizens. On the other hand, crises, however, also can hinder reform. 
The studies of voting behavior in post-communist countries find that costly reforms 
undermine support for pro-reform parties and may lead to such parties being voted out of 
office (Fidrmuc, 2000 a,b; Jackson, Klich and Poznańska, 2001; Tucker, 2002). Such political 
reversals, in turn, may allow the winners of partial reform to capture the government and stall 
the reform momentum (Hellman, 1998). This suggests that there is indeed a thin line between 
vicious and virtuous crises (Krueger, 1993): some crises generate political consensus in favor 
of reform while others instead lead to the reform being abandoned. Nevertheless, when 
investigating the adverse effect of crises on reform momentum empirically, Pitlik (2011), 
reassuringly, finds no evidence that crises cause reforms to be reversed.  
We therefore explore the effect of crises on a broad range of outcomes, both economic 
and political. One problem in this respect is that episodes of crises and fundamental reforms 
are relatively rare. Therefore, rather than address this issue in a large sample of countries with 
only few observations of crises or reform, we focus on a sample of countries that are rich both 
in reform and crisis episodes: the post-communist countries. These countries were all 
characterized by a high degree of government interference in their economies, high to 
exclusive public ownership of productive assets and high to complete central control over 
prices. All experienced deteriorating economic performance in the course of the 1980s which 
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eventually lead to (attempted) systemic reforms in the early 1990s. There was, however, 
substantial variation in terms of reforms implemented and their outcomes. Some countries 
implemented ambitious reforms early on and, in a space of a few years, managed to put in 
place Western-style democratic regimes and market-economy system. Others muddles 
through, reversed previously implemented reforms and/or suffered state capture by interest 
groups. In terms of growth, countries such as Poland, Czech Republic but also Uzbekistan 
experienced relatively mild recessions and started recovering after 2-5 years. Other post-
communist countries saw their output falling by as much as two-thirds (Moldova, Tajikistan) 
or even three quarters (Georgia) of the pre-transition level, with the recession lasting in some 
cases for as long as a decade. While most transition economies experienced episodes of high 
inflation, some managed to bring inflation under control quickly while others suffered 
protracted periods of high inflation or hyperinflation. While some post-communist countries 
became members of the OECD and EU, some others reverted back to authoritarian regimes or 
became, at least temporarily, failed states.  
We use the variation in the severity of transition-induced crises as well as the economic 
and institution outcomes to analyze the legacy of crises. The scope of our analysis is thus 
broader than any of the previous contributions. With respect to identifying crises and their 
severity, we consider both growth and inflation. In turn, we consider the effect of crises on the 
subsequent economic reform, democratization, multiple measures of economic performance 
and institutional change.  
After briefly introducing the data in the following section, section 3 presents the results of 
our analysis of the impact of crises on economic liberalization, growth, investments, inflation 
and institutional change and section 4 summarizes our findings.  
 
2 Data 
The analysis covers all post-communist countries for which data are available. Altogether, we 
use data on 29 countries1 that used to belong to the Soviet zone of influence, including the 
former constituent republics of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia. Our data 
therefore the years 1990 to 2008. The starting point is limited by data availability: little 
information on these countries is available for the earlier years. Furthermore, the reforms we 
consider were initiated mostly after 1990 (the main exception is former Yugoslavia which 
experienced limited and partial reforms already during the 1980s). We include data through to 
2008 so as to eliminate the current on-going economic crisis. The aftermath of the current 
crisis is not fully known yet so that including it would only serve to interfere with the effects 
of the transition-induced crises.  
To capture the countries’ progress in implementing market-oriented reforms, we use the 
average of the eight progress-in-transition indicator compiled and published annually by the 
EBRD.2 We exploit the World Bank Development Indicators 2009 as the source of all 
                                                 
1 Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Mongolia, Monte Negro, 
Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan.  
2 These indicators measure each country’s progress in the following fields: price liberalization, foreign exchange 
and trade liberalization, small scale privatization, large scale privatization, enterprise reform, competition policy, 
banking reform and non-banking financial institutions. Each indicators ranges from 1 (unreformed centrally-
planned economy) to 4+ (liberal market economy). As is common in this  literature, we replace plus and minus 
distinctions  by adding and subtracting 0.33 (so that 4+ becomes 4.33 while 4- is 3.67). We do not use the more 
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macroeconomic variables, except for unemployment rates which we obtained from the EBRD 
Transition Reports (various issues). We use the average Freedom House democracy index3 
and Kaufmann and al.’s (2009) governance indicators to take account of the progress in 
political and institutional transitions. Finally, we code whether countries were engaged in 
military conflict (external or internal) based on the Correlates of War (2010) dataset.   
 
3 Long-term Effect of Crises  
As the first step in our analysis, we need a variable to measure the severity of transition-
induced recession. To do this, we compute the cumulative output fall (in percent) since 1989. 
We only consider the overall contraction of output and not the subsequent recovery (which we 
seek to explain). That means that once output reaches the bottom of its post-1989 trajectory, 
we keep the cumulative output fall at the level attained at this lowest point.4 Our objective is 
to see whether the severity of transition-induced recession has had a lasting impact on the 
subsequent pace of market-oriented reform, economic performance and other outcomes of 
interest. Furthermore, we construct a “time after crisis” variable which takes the value 0 
during the crisis, and becomes a time trend thereafter. We interact this time variable with 
output fall to test whether the effect of the crisis diminishes or strengthens over time.  
We first consider the impact of output fall on progress in implementing market oriented 
reform. The dependent variable is the speed of reform, proxied with the first difference in the 
average of eight EBRD progress-in-transition indicators. Each regression includes the lagged 
level of this index to account for the past level of reform: holding everything else constant, a 
country can implement more reform if its starting level of reform is low. We also include the 
lagged level of the average Freedom House democracy index to account for the possible 
reform-fostering effect of democratization (Fidrmuc, 2003) and a dummy for countries 
experiencing a military conflict. Except for the war dummy, all independent variables are 
included in lags in order to avoid any endogeneity problems. All regressions are fixed-effects 
panel regressions.  
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 1. Column (1) presents the most 
parsimonious specification. We find that the lagged reform index slows down reform; this is 
not surprising given that the reform index is bound from above. The level of past democracy, 
on the other hand, fosters economic reform. Not surprisingly, countries affected by war make 
less progress with respect to reform. Finally, the primary variable of interest, output fall, is 
positive and highly significant: countries that experienced a deeper contraction, ceteris 
paribus, respond to this by accelerating economic reform.  
It is possible, however, that this effect is found only because output fall is correlated with 
some other influential variable. In column (2), we therefore replace output fall with lagged 
per-capita GDP (in thousands of PPP US dollars) to capture the effect of the level of 
economic development on progress in reform. Its effect is negative and significant – richer 
countries implement less reform – which is similar to the positive effect of output fall in 
                                                                                                                                                        
recently available EBRD indicators of infrastructure reform, only the eight original indicators measuring 
progress in Washington-consensus reform (liberalization, stabilization and privatization).  
3 Specifically, this index is the average of the Freedom House measures of political freedoms and civil liberties, 
rescaled so that higher values correspond to more democracy. It ranges between 1 (autocracy) to 7 (fully free).  
4 In several cases, a country in question experienced a double-dip recession. One example is Russia where output 
initially started to recover in 1997 only to fall further in 1998 following its economic and financial crisis. In that 
case, we consider the deeper dip out of the two as the bottom of the transformational recession (the second dip in 
1998 in Russian case).  
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column (1). However, when we include both output fall and GDP per person side by side in 
column (3), only output fall remains significant while GDP per capita now has no effect on 
reform. In column (4), we add lagged inflation (in logs to reduce the influence of episodes of 
extremely high inflation). Its effect is positive and significant: a recent experience of high 
inflation helps accelerate reforms. Yet, the effect of output fall remains strongly significant 
and essentially unchanged. Finally, the last column introduces quadratic polynomial of the 
time that elapsed since the end of crisis: on its own and interacted with output fall.5 The 
quadratic time trend can potentially capture the time-specific profile of reform while the 
interaction term between time and output fall will show whether the effect of crises on 
subsequent reform strengthens or diminishes over time. None of these variables are 
significant: the effect of crises on reform does not vary over time.  
Next, in Table 2, we consider the effect of crises on the disaggregated EBRD sub-indexes. 
These regressions replicate column (4) of Table 1, except the dependent variable and the 
lagged index of reform now is the sub-index denoted in the heading of each column. The 
results are remarkably consistent across the eight sub-indexes and are similar to those 
obtained with the average index: lagged sub-index of reform has a negative effect, lagged 
democracy has a positive effect and output fall again displays a positive and strongly 
significant effect on subsequent progress in reform. Hence, having experienced a crisis in the 
past stimulates progress across all aspects of the reform program. While the coefficients 
estimated for the various sub-indexes are quite similar to each other (and to that reported in 
column 4 of Table 1), the crisis effect is particularly pronounced for removal of price controls, 
liberalization of foreign trade and small-scale privatization.  
So far, we have shown that having experienced a crisis fosters economic reform. 
Inasmuch as economic reform improves economic policy making, the legacy of past crisis 
should, indirectly, improve economic performance too. We now turn, in Table 3, to 
investigating whether crises affect economic performance also directly. The dependent 
variable is the growth rate of per-capita GDP. Each regression controls again for lagged 
reform index, to account for the possible indirect effect. We also control for investment to in 
GDP ratio and involvement in military conflicts. Reform progress, as expected, has a positive 
coefficient: countries that have implemented more ambitious reform are rewarded by faster 
growth. Somewhat surprisingly, investment is never significant. Military conflicts impose a 
heavy penalty on economic performance. Past output contraction translates into faster 
subsequent growth. This effect is again robust to controlling for economic convergence by 
including lagged GDP per person (which appears with negative coefficient, as is standard in 
the growth literature, but is not significant when included alongside output fall, see columns 2 
and 3) and inflation (which lowers growth, see column 4). Finally, in column (5), we again 
introduce the quadratic polynomial of time since end of crisis and its interactions with output 
fall. The quadratic time trend is not significant but the interaction terms are. Specifically, we 
observe an inverted U-shaped pattern: the positive effect of the crisis initially strengthens but 
eventually declines again.6  
In Tables 4 and 5, we consider the effect of output fall on investment to GDP ratio and the 
ratio of inward FDI to GDP. Investment is an important determinant of growth (even though 
the preceding set of regressions failed to confirm this for our set of countries). FDI, besides 
                                                 
5 We also test for non linear effect of output fall itself by introducing it in quadratic form but it was insignificant. 
This result is available upon request.  
6 We also introduce a quadratic term of output fall. We found a U shaped relationship between output fall and 
growth. Yet, the minimum of the function stands at 13.1, which is below the lowest observed output fall in our 
sample (Belarus in 1992 with an output fall of 13.35). Therefore, output fall has always a positive effect on 
growth.   
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bringing in additional capital into the country, can also be associated with important 
technological spillovers. The regressions follow similar structure as those in preceding Tables. 
Again, the lagged reform index has a strong positive effect on investment and also on FDI 
(although the coefficients estimated for the latter are not always significant). The effect of 
past crises, however, now appears significantly negative: having had a crisis in the past 
discourages both domestic investment and inflow of investment from abroad. For investment, 
however, this is counterbalanced by a positive time-varying effect of past crises, as reflected 
in the positive interaction between output fall and time since crisis. Hence, investment 
declines in the aftermath of crises but then catches up later.  
Table 6 considers the effect of crises on inflation, which however is never significant. 
Hence, crisis, at least inasmuch as it is measured by economic contraction, does not affect 
subsequent inflation (we consider the effect of high-inflation episodes on subsequent inflation 
below).  
As discussed in the introduction, crises may also affect political developments and quality 
of institutions. We now turn to this possibility. In Table 7, we consider the impact of past 
crises on democratization as measured by the average of indexes of political freedoms and 
civil liberties reported by the Freedom House. The dependent variable is the first difference of 
this measure and regressions control also for the lagged level of democracy. Since we found 
earlier that crises translate into faster economic reform and that democratization also 
correlates with economic reform, we expected to find a positive effect again. Surprisingly, we 
find the reverse: the deeper the crisis, the slower the subsequent democratization process. This 
effect is very robust to the inclusion of other variables, including GDP per capita (which has a 
positive, although not always significant, effect on democratization) and inflation (which 
slows down democratization). We again allow the effect to vary over time but the interaction 
terms are not significant. Finally, we also introduce a quadratic term of the output fall to allow 
for nonlinearity in the effect (results available upon request). We find a U-shaped effect, with 
the minimum attained for output fall reaching 39.5 percent: only deep enough crises appear to 
foster democratization.  
To assess the effect of crises on institutional quality, we use the governance indicators 
constructed by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2009). Kaufmann et al. aggregate 
information from a host of other sources and surveys assessing quality of institutions in six 
areas: control of corruption, voice and accountability, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, and rule of law. The indicators are constructed so that higher 
values always correspond to better institutions. Their coverage, however, is limited: the 
indicators are available at semi-annual frequency from 1996 to 2000 and then annually from 
2002. Because of this, we are unable to use lags of these variables: we therefore use lags of 
both economic reform (EBRD) and democracy (Freedom House) indexes instead (Table 8).7 
Both of these indexes are positive; the effect of economic reform is always strongly 
significant while that of democracy is significantly positive in three regressions out of six. 
There are thus important spillovers from economic policy and democratization to institutional 
quality. The effect of past crises, however, is never significant. However, the time-varying 
effect is U-shaped, with the quadratic term always significant. This implies that although past 
crises may initially lead to a worsening of institutions in the short term, this is followed by an 
improvement later on: when it comes to crises, good things come to those who wait.  
Finally, economic crises tend to be manifested not only in output contractions but also in 
high inflation. We therefore construct another variable capturing cumulative inflation. This is 
                                                 
7 Note that as the indicators are not available before 1996, the early transition period is dropped from the 
analysis.  
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an index of the overall cumulative price increase since 1989 (i.e. value of 2 corresponds to a 
doubling of the price level, 10 implies a ten-fold increase in prices, etc.). Once inflation has 
been stabilized, the index stays at the level attained at the time of stabilization. We define 
stabilization as inflation of 80% pa or lower: most countries in our data set succeed in 
controlling inflation after it has been brought down to two-digit levels, therefore this threshold 
tends to be indicative of a successful stabilization. The cumulative inflation variable thus 
captures the legacy of high inflation in the past even after run-away inflation has been 
stopped. All regressions, reported in Table 9, again control for the level of the reform index 
(which is not consistently significant) and for being involved in a military conflict (not 
surprisingly, wars are associated with much higher inflation). We also include our measure of 
output fall and GDP: neither appears significant as a determinant of inflation. However, 
cumulative inflation is significantly negative in every regression: having a legacy of high 
inflation in the past exerts a negative effect on subsequent price growth. This stands in 
contrast with the insignificant effect of output fall: when it comes to inflation, countries learn 
a lesson from past high-inflation episodes but not from recessions.  
 
4 Conclusions 
In this paper, we investigate the effect of crises on economic reforms, economic performance, 
democratization and institutional change. To this effect, we utilize the experience of the post-
communist countries, virtually all of which experienced crises (extraordinarily severe crises in 
some cases) following the demise of communism and central planning in the early 1990s. Our 
results suggest that crises indeed serve as a catalyst for reforms: history of having experienced 
a crisis in the past is associated into greater economic reform and better institutions (although 
the institutional improvement only occurs with a delay). Crises also translate into better 
economic performance: they are followed by higher growth, lower inflation and, with a delay, 
higher investment. Our results thus offer support for the ‘crises beget reform’ hypothesis put 
forward by Alesina and Drazen (1991), and suggest that the favorable effect of crises goes 
beyond accelerating economic reform. 
A plausible implication of our results is that seeking to ferestall crises at all costs, as is the 
case with the current and on-going bailouts of Greece and other peripheral Eurozone 
countries, need not necessarily be productive: the short-term gain so obtained may come at a 
cost of postponing or even avoiding reform and, in turn, lower long-term economic growth.  
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Table 1 Output Fall and Progress in Market-oriented Reform  
Dependent variable:  EBRD index (first difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Lagged EBRD 
index -0.278 -0.185 -0.302 -0.277 -0.297 
 (0.014)** (0.012)** (0.017)** (0.019)** (0.022)** 
Lagged Democracy  0.079 0.059 0.077 0.065 0.063 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.009)** 
War -0.085 -0.108 -0.064 -0.104 -0.087 
 (0.027)** (0.032)** (0.030)* (0.031)** (0.032)** 
Lagged outputfall 0.006  0.007 0.006 0.005 
 (0.001)**  (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Lagged gdp p.c.   -0.013 0.005 0.008 -0.006 
 (thousands)  (0.004)** (0.004) (0.004)* (0.006) 
Lagged inflation    0.013 0.019 
    (0.004)** (0.005)** 
Outputfall*time     0.0001 
      (0.0002) 
Outputfall*time²     -5.96e-06 
      (1.68e-05) 
Time after crisis     0.004 
      (0.011) 
Time after crisis²     0.000 
      (0.001) 
Constant 0.265 0.421 0.241 0.23 0.358 
 (0.031)** (0.038)** (0.040)** (0.049)** (0.064)** 
Observations 550 524 524 495 495 
Number of 
Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.45 0.39 0.48 0.5 0.52 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 2 Output Fall and Sub-indexes of Progress in Market-oriented Reform 
Dependent variable: 
Large-scale 
Privatization 
Small-scale 
Privatization 
Enterprise 
Reform 
Price 
Controls 
Foreign 
Trade 
Competition 
Policy 
Banking 
Security 
Markets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Lagged EBRD -0.241 -0.309 -0.402 -0.524 -0.392 -0.286 -0.316 -0.270 
sub-index (0.025)** (0.022)** (0.030)** (0.034)** (0.028)** (0.029)** (0.030)** (0.028)** 
Lagged Democracy 0.073 0.089 0.102 0.077 0.079 0.060 0.095 0.057 
 (0.017)** (0.015)** (0.014)** (0.020)** (0.020)** (0.012)** (0.016)** (0.013)** 
War -0.127 -0.087 -0.137 -0.016 -0.264 -0.050 -0.110 0.022 
 (0.064)* (0.060) (0.052)** (0.081) (0.076)** (0.051) (0.058) (0.053) 
Lagged outputfall 0.006 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.013 0.005 0.009 0.005 
 (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.001)** (0.001)** (0.001)** 
Lagged gdp p.c. -0.005 -0.006 0.017 0.015 0.006 0.022 0.022 0.018 
(thousands) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)** (0.009) (0.009) (0.006)** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
Lagged inflation 0.005 0.018 0.007 0.037 0.002 0.007 0.008 -0.008 
 (0.008) (0.007)* (0.006) (0.009)** (0.010) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) 
Constant 0.194 0.349 -0.002 0.977 0.547 0.009 -0.099 0.044 
 (0.102) (0.095)** (0.082) (0.130)** (0.121)** (0.080) (0.093) (0.083) 
Observations 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 495 
Number of 
Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.27 0.43 0.35 0.45 0.38 0.21 0.28 0.19 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses. Lagged EBRD sub-index is the same index as that denoted in the 
column heading. Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 3 Output Fall and Economic Growth 
Dependent variable: GDP p.c. growth rate 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged EBRD index 4.031 7.612 4.158 2.273 1.804 
  (0.725)** (0.520)** (0.854)** (0.731)** (0.880)* 
Lagged Investment 0.009 -0.063 0.018 -0.017 -0.018 
  (0.058) (0.057) (0.058) (0.044) (0.046) 
War -12.359 -14.932 -12.957 -9.455 -8.251 
  (1.717)** (1.752)** (1.753)** (1.334)** (1.359)** 
Lagged outputfall 0.246  0.248 0.327 0.259 
  (0.043)**  (0.049)** (0.040)** (0.042)** 
Lagged gdp p.c.   -0.613 -0.134 -0.259 -0.480 
  (thousands)  (0.182)** (0.201) (0.149) (0.233)* 
Lagged inflation    -1.404 -1.001 
     (0.162)** (0.185)** 
Time*outputfall     0.027 
      (0.010)** 
Time²*outputfall     -0.002 
       (0.001)* 
Time after crisis     -0.239 
      (0.424) 
Time after crisis²     0.023 
      (0.027) 
Constant -16.473 -10.567 -16.062 -8.709 -7.236 
  (1.819)** (1.849)** (2.109)** (1.932)** (2.536)** 
Observations 505 503 503 479 479 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.49 0.46 0.49 0.67 0.69 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 4 Output Fall and Investment 
Dependent variable Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged  EBRDindex 4.246 1.808 4.242 5.018 6.681 
  (0.516)** (0.401)** (0.643)** (0.752)** (0.852)** 
War -4.086 -3.383 -4.386 -4.333 -1.949 
  (1.283)** (1.344)* (1.331)** (1.420)** (1.390) 
Lagged outputfall -0.171  -0.171 -0.182 -0.205 
  (0.028)**  (0.036)** (0.041)** (0.042)** 
Lagged gdp p.c.   0.562 0.148 0.115 0.021 
   (thousands)  (0.142)** (0.164) (0.164) (0.243) 
Lagged inflation    0.123 -0.025 
     (0.174) (0.190) 
outputfall*time     0.030 
      (0.010)** 
outputfall*time²     -0.001 
      (0.001) 
Time after crisis     -2.254 
      (0.430)** 
Time after crisis²     0.102 
      (0.027)** 
Constant 18.014 13.921 16.948 14.972 14.752 
  (0.981)** (1.271)** (1.396)** (1.909)** (2.492)** 
Observations 520 508 508 481 481 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.15 0.12 0.16 0.19 0.29 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 5 Output Fall and Foreign Direct Investment Inflow 
Dependent variable: Foreign Direct Investment 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged EBRD index 5.266 0.418 5.840 3.409 2.243 
  (1.778)** (1.650) (2.229)** (2.758) (3.249) 
War 11.273 17.804 13.285 14.052 14.632 
  (4.439)* (4.487)** (4.607)** (4.952)** (5.215)** 
Lagged outputfall -0.456  -0.523 -0.527 -0.581 
  (0.123)**  (0.147)** (0.154)** (0.162)** 
Lagged gdp p.c.   0.721 -0.023 -0.096 -0.944 
   (thousands)  (0.459) (0.499) (0.518) (0.824) 
Lagged inflation    -0.995 -0.580 
     (0.619) (0.727) 
Outputfall*time     0.028 
      (0.035) 
Outputfall*time²     -0.002 
      (0.002) 
Time after crisis     -0.428 
      (1.518) 
Time after crisis²     0.088 
      (0.095) 
Constant 8.692 -1.327 9.772 19.631 25.971 
  (4.492) (4.336) (5.295) (7.982)* (9.875)** 
Observations 477 472 472 454 454 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.07 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.08 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 6 Output Fall and Inflation  
Dependent variable: Inflation 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Lagged  EBRD index 4.104 51.012 139.601 1,060.744 
  (461.71) (393.82) (586.14) (742.235) 
War 4,552.84 5,083.95 5,040.40 4,149.849 
  (1,126.2)** (1,172.3)** (1,192.7)** (1,268.049)** 
Lagged outputfall 4.308  -6.22 24.121 
  (24.06)  (30.46) (33.539) 
Lagged Gdp p.c.   -8.138 -23.865 253.472 
   (thousands)  (128.2) (149.66) (231.440) 
Outputfall*time    -7.128 
     (9.560) 
Outputfall*time²    0.362 
     (0.657) 
Time after crisis    -183.630 
     (428.574) 
Time after crisis²    0.673 
     (27.677) 
Constant -21.855 73.299 189.697 -3,442.930 
  (944.906) (1,181.98) (1,313.27) (2,236.885) 
Observations 524 512 512 512 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.06 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 7 Output Fall and Democratization  
Dependent variable: Democracy (first difference) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Lagged democracy -0.343 -0.376 -0.358 -0.366 -0.373 
 (0.021)** (0.022)** (0.022)** (0.024)** (0.025)** 
Lagged output fall -0.005  -0.006 -0.005 -0.007 
 (0.001)**  (0.002)** (0.002)** (0.003)* 
War -0.551 -0.397 -0.507 -0.381 -0.322 
 (0.089)** (0.092)** (0.095)** (0.100)** (0.104)** 
Lagged gdp p.c.   0.032 0.023 0.008 -0.011 
  (thousands)  (0.010)** (0.010)* (0.011) (0.019) 
Lagged inflation    -0.035 -0.034 
    (0.011)** (0.014)* 
Outputfall*time     0.001 
      (0.001) 
Outputfall*time²     -0.0001 
      (0.0001) 
Time after crisis     -0.062 
      (0.031)* 
Time after crisis²     0.004 
      (0.002)* 
Constant 1.810 1.538 1.759 1.966 2.158 
  (0.101)** (0.110)** (0.123)** (0.157)** (0.206)** 
Observations 551 525 525 496 496 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.37 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.38 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 8 Output Fall and Quality of institutions 
Dependent variable: 
Control of 
Corruption 
Voice and 
Account-
ability 
Political 
Stability 
Gov 
Effective-
ness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Lagged EBRD index 0.155 0.192 0.340 0.313 0.270 0.144 
 (0.085) (0.076)** (0.127)** (0.078)** (0.086)** (0.068)* 
Lagged democracy 0.103 0.214 0.027 0.039 0.014 0.068 
 (0.026)** (0.023)** (0.039) (0.024) (0.027) (0.021)** 
Lagged output fall -0.006 -0.015 0.012 -0.009 0.004 -0.021 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011) 
War -0.002 -0.183 -1.069 -0.148 -0.812 -0.198 
  (0.204) (0.182) (0.304)** (0.189) (0.206)** (0.164) 
Lagged gdp p.c.  0.038 -0.018 0.033 0.032 -0.016 0.052 
  (thousands) (0.011) (0.010) (0.017)* (0.011)** (0.011) (0.009)** 
Lagged inflation -0.052 -0.010 0.032 -0.007 -0.013 -0.004 
  (log) (0.012) (.010) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.009) 
Outputfall*time -0.0013 -0.0009 -0.0008 -0.0020 -0.0011 -0.0006 
  (0.0006)* (0.0005) (0.0009) (0.0006)** (0.0006) (0.0004) 
Outputfall*time² 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.0000)** (0.0000)* (0.0000)* (0.0000)** (0.0000)** (0.0000)** 
Time after crisis 0.0348 0.026 -0.042 0.077 0.035 -0.018 
  (0.0282) (0.025) (0.042) (0.026) (0.028) (0.023) 
Time after crisis² -0.0053 -0.0023 -0.0007 -0.0058 -0.0019 -0.0027 
 (0.0015)** (0.0014) (0.0023) (0.0014)** (0.0015) (0.0012)* 
Constant -1.076 -0.828 -1.758 -1.099 -1.124 -0.294 
 (0.628) (0.559) (0.935) (0.582) (0.633) (0.503) 
Observations 278 278 278 278 278 278 
Number of Countries 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R-squared 0.36 0.46 0.30 0.36 0.51 0.40 
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
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Table 9 Cumulative Inflation and Subsequent Inflation 
  Inflation   
 (1) (2) (3)  
Lagged EBRD index 55.355 234.517 231.533  
 (484.589) (422.007) (619.201)  
War 3,839.13 4,217.13 4,219.20  
 (1,211.194)** (1,239.001)** (1,279.563)**  
Lagged outputfall 11.216  0.221  
 (26.885)  (33.533)  
Lagged gdp p.c.  -42.474 -41.971  
   (thousands)  (131.345) (152.015)  
Cumulated inflation  -0.002 -0.002 -0.002  
 (0.000)** (0.000)** (0.000)**  
Constant -92.201 148.483 144.648  
 (1,019.0) (1,237.3) (1,368.5)  
Observations 493 482 482  
Number of Countries 27 27 27  
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09  
All regressions include country-specific fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.  
Significance: * 5%; ** 1% 
 
